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This paper elaborates on the evolution of the informal sector vis-à-vis the evolution of agricultural and 
formal sectors in a stylized developing country economy in process of growth. The analytical contribution 
of this essay extends the Ramsey theory of growth into a framework that includes an informal sector, and 
household preferences that display Engel effects in agricultural and in informally produced goods. Besides 
showing that the informal sector’s importance diminishes over time as the economy grows, the results from 
the model demonstrate that a country can successfully reduce its informal employment by reducing tax on 
employment in the formal sector. 
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1. Introduction 
Until the early 1970’s, less developed countries were often characterized by dual 
economies, with a traditional agricultural sector and a more modern, urban sector. The 
dichotomy within the urban sector (traditional urban versus modern urban) in these countries 
was considered to be a temporary phenomenon by most authors, that is, the traditional urban 
employment was considered to be a temporary mode of employment for the unskilled 
agricultural labor en route to a permanent modern urban employment (Lewis, 1954; Ranis 
and Fei, 1961; Todaro, 1969). However, studies first by Hart (1973) on urban employment in 
Ghana and later by International Labour Office (1973) redefined the traditional urban sector 
as the ‘informal’ sector, and argued that in less developed countries, informal sector 
employment was a permanent rather than a temporary source of employment, and should be 
examined separately from employment in the ‘formal’ sector. Following these studies, the 
analysis of the dualism between formal and informal sectors, particularly analyzing the 
informal sector in less developed countries, has gained much momentum, and created a 
sizeable literature1. 
In the literature, several terms have been used to describe informal economic activity 
around the world: unofficial, shadow, hidden, underground, illegal, unrecorded, unreported, 
parallel, and black. Although there may be nuances in these terms, they all have a common 
denominator: “those engaged in (such) activities circumvent, escape, or are excluded from 
the institutional system of rules, rights, regulations and enforcement penalties that governs 
those agents engaged in formal production and exchange” (Feige, 1990). Particularly in less 
developed and developing countries, informal economic activity, or the term “informal 
sector” has additional connotations: this term usually describes a small scale, traditional 
industry sector, characterized by ease of entry, reliance on indigenous resources, family 
ownership of enterprises, labor intensive technologies, skills acquired outside the formal 
 2
school system, and unregulated and competitive markets (Bromley, 1978).  Several empirical 
studies (including Schneider and Enste, 2000; Loayza, 1996; Friedman, et al., 2000; World 
Bank World Development Report, 2002) have found a large informal sector to be an 
important characteristic of less developed and developing economies. Schneider and Enste 
compare the size of the informal economy in 76 countries between 1989 and 1993, and find 
that on average, in developing countries (Africa, Central and South America, Asia), the size 
of the informal economy is between 35% and 44% of official GDP, in transition countries 
(former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), between 21% and 35% of official GDP, whereas 
in OECD countries, it is about 15%. Loayza estimates the size of the informal sector in Latin 
America to be 39% of official GDP on average for the early 1990’s, ranging from 18% in 
Chile to 66% in Bolivia. In his famous study on Lima, Peru, de Soto (1989) estimates the size 
of the informal sector to be 39% of official GDP in the early 1980’s, and to grow to 61% in 
year 2000. He has also reported that some 61% of total work hours have been devoted to 
informal economic activity during the early 1980’s in Lima. These findings, among others, 
imply a strong negative relationship between the level of economic development and the size 
of the informal sector. Furthermore, a negative relationship can be observed between GDP 
per capita (US$, PPP adjusted) and the share of informal urban employment in total urban 
employment (as an indicator of informal activity) amongst developing countries, as depicted 
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Source: WDI (2003) and WDI Online (2004), World Bank 
Figure 1: GDP per capita vs. informal employment 
In the light of such observations, using a dynamic general equilibrium framework, this 
study firstly demonstrates that the size of informal activity diminishes as a country 
accumulates capital and grows towards the long-run equilibrium. A multi-sector dynamic 
general equilibrium model with consumer optimization is developed, in which consumers 
have non-homothetic preferences. Production occurs in three sectors, agricultural, formal and 
informal2, employing the three factors of production owned by consumers, i.e. land, labor, 
and capital. Production sectors are differentiated from each other by the type of the goods 
they produce, and also by their relative factor intensities. One identifying feature of the 
formal sector is that firms in this sector face regulations in the form of employment taxes; 
agricultural and informal sector firms evade such regulatory measures, which can be regarded 
as a common characteristic of developing countries. As the economy transitions into the 
long-run equilibrium, in addition to the supply-side effects implied by relative factor 
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intensities, the demand side of the economy is expected to have a substantial impact on how 
the economy proceeds, as well. 
In the literature, theoretical studies linking the informal sector to the macroeconomy 
include Kelley (1994), Loayza (1996), and Ihrig and Moe (2001, 2004), among the few. In 
particular, Kelley investigates the macroeconomic implications of the informal sector using a 
multi-sector computable general equilibrium model for Peru for 1985. With the help of this 
model, Kelley is able to trace the role of the informal sector in the macro adjustment process 
and also conversely, examine how the informal sector reacts to changing macroeconomic 
conditions. By its very nature, Kelley’s model is static, and does not capture how the 
informal sector evolves through time in an economy.  
Within the framework of an endogenous growth model based on the AK-model, Loayza 
shows that informal activity arises when governments with limited enforcement capacity 
impose excessive taxes and regulations on the economy. As pointed out in Ihrig and Moe 
(2004), Loayza’s study, being an AK-model, does not depict the transitional dynamics of the 
informal sector detected in actual economies. Ihrig and Moe3 construct a homogenous-
consumption-good, inter-temporal model in which the agents in the economy choose to 
allocate time between working in the capital intensive-formal and labor intensive-informal 
sectors. In this model, formal sector firms pay taxes to the government, while informal sector 
firms pay taxes only when they are caught by the authorities. They demonstrate that as an 
economy grows; holding all else constant, the informal sector employment and thus the size 
of the informal sector activity naturally diminishes4, as observed in actual data. Furthermore, 
this study indicates that tax policies play a more crucial role than enforcement policies in 
attracting people out of the informal sector into the formal sector, and raising the standard of 
living in the long-run. 
 5
In contrast to Ihrig and Moe5, our study incorporates heterogeneous goods and an 
endogenous price for the informal sector good. As a result, we will be able to trace the 
evolution of the informal sector vis-à-vis the other sectors in the economy depending also on 
the movement of the relative prices as capital accumulates and the output in each sector 
changes6. 
The next section introduces the theoretical model and its basic properties, and 
additionally defines and characterizes the competitive equilibrium for the model economy. In 
Section 3, the case of Turkey is presented. Section 4 applies the model to Turkey, 
exhibiting how the economy evolves over time, and how this process is affected by policy 
changes, particularly by a reduction in employment tax rates. Section 5 concludes this 
study. 
2. The Basic Model 
This section introduces the model environment, assumptions about consumer preferences 
and production technologies. A small open economy with three production sectors is 
described. These three sectors capture the two types of dualism in developing countries: 
dualism between traditional agricultural and modern sectors, and dualism within the modern 
sector, formal versus informal production. In each period, production of formal and informal 
sector goods requires the use of capital and labor, and production of agricultural goods 
requires labor, capital, and land, which is a fixed, sector-specific factor. Firms in all sectors 
are perfectly competitive in both goods and factors markets. Agricultural sector produces a 
pure consumption good that can be internationally traded; on the other hand the informal 
sector produces a pure consumption good that can be traded only domestically. Formal 
sector produces both a consumption and an investment good that can be traded 
internationally. Another identifying characteristic of the formal sector is that formal sector 
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firms pay labor taxes to the government, while agricultural and informal sector firms evade 
such taxes. Labor and capital are perfectly mobile across all sectors; and land can be rented 
in or out only within the agricultural sector. There is no mobility of the labor and capital 
across nations.  
2.1. Theory 
There is a representative household who consumes and realizes expenditures on all three 
types of consumption goods: agricultural good (food), a formally produced good, and an 
informally produced good, and she wishes to maximize the present value of discounted 
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where at time t, c(t) is an index of intra-temporal per capita consumption composite, k(t) is 
the capital per capita, )(tω is the wage, r(t) is the return on per unit of capital, s(t) is the 
return in land, )(tψ  is the per capita lump-sum transfers from the government, equal to labor 
taxes paid by formal sector firms, E(c(t), p(t)) is the aggregate household expenditure on 
consumption, p(t) is a vector of output prices, θ/1  is the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution, and ρ  is the time preference rate.  The representative household faces a two-
stage consumption choice problem: an inter-temporal problem where she decides on how 
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much to save and how much to expend on aggregate consumption and an intra-temporal 
problem where she decides on how much to spend on each consumption item. 
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 where jc is the consumption of good j, j=1,2,3, B>0 is a constant
7 and 1321 =++ λλλ . In 
this study, the non-homotheticity of the Stone-Geary preferences are meant to capture the 
Engel effects, i.e. the household devotes a smaller portion of her total expenditures on 
consumption of agricultural and informal sector goods as her income increases8. Furthermore, 
these preferences imply that the income elasticities of the demand for agricultural and 
informal sector goods are less than one, and that for the formal sector goods is equal to one. 
Here, 1γ  of agricultural good can be interpreted as the level of subsistence food consumption, 
while 3γ of informal good may be interpreted as the purchases of the household from 
informal goods markets before any substantial purchases are made in the formal goods 
markets. 
At each period in time, the representative household chooses consumption bundles of 
three types of goods so as to minimize her per period expenditures, given her instantaneous 
consumption composite, c. Given the prices ),,( 321 pppp = and aggregate consumption c, 
the minimized total expenditures are 
3311321
321),( γγλλλ ppcppppcE ++=           (5) 
Accordingly, the conditional demands for each consumption item are 
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Solution to the intertemporal problem of the representative household yields the Euler 





















                                                                                                    (7) 
In order to be able to numerically solve the model presented above for equilibria, we 
specify the production parameters of the model economy in detail. In particular, the 
production functions of the firms representing each sector are of the constant-returns-to-scale, 
Cobb-Douglas type. The production of the agricultural firm is represented by 
321
11111
ααα TKLBbY =  
where 0, 11 >Bb are scaling constants
10, )1,0(3,2,1 ∈ααα  and 1321 =++ ααα .  Note that 
since the land input T is fixed, the returns to labor and capital in agriculture are diminishing. 














respectively. Similar to the agricultural production function, here, 3,2,0, => jBb jj  are the 





2.2. Competitive Equilibrium 
Definition A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a list of sequences of output 
prices, consumption levels, wage rates, capital and land rental rates, and production plans for 
each sector such that 
i) given output and input prices, the representative household maximizes the present 
value of her discounted intertemporal utility; 
ii) given output and input prices, representative firms in each sector maximize profits; 
iii) market clears in the non-tradable (informal) goods market; 
iv) labor and capital markets clear; 
vi) Walras' Law holds; 
vii) no-arbitrage condition holds between capital and land assets; and 
viii) total taxes (contributions towards employee’s social security premiums) paid by 
formal sector firms equal total transfer payments. 
2.2.1. Characterization of Competitive Equilibrium 
In equilibrium, profit maximization in formal and informal sectors implies12 
(8.2)                                                                                                  ),(










where ),( and ),~( 32 rMCrMC ωω denote the marginal cost in each sector, and p3 is the 
relative price of the informal good. The formal sector firms pay labor taxes in the form of 
contributions towards the employees' social security premiums ( fτ ), hence per unit labor 
cost of the formal sector firm is )1(~ fτωω += . Using (8.1) and (8.2), wages and informal 
good prices are expressed as functions of capital rental rate, 
(9.2)                                                                                                           )(p







Factor market clearing conditions allow us to solve for functions for output levels in formal 
and informal sectors in terms of capital rental rate and capital13: 
(10.2)                                                                                                       ),(y








From the informal goods market clearing condition 33 yc = , and (6.3), we have 
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p),( γγγλ rpkr
(r)krE ++−=  
After substituting equation (12) for household expenditures, the intertemporal budget 
constraint for the household can be written as: 







Total time-differentiating the informal goods market clearing condition (11), we obtain 


















































in which  
)),(y)((p)(p 3313 31 γλ
λλ −= krrrcp                                        (15) 
and 















Finally, after substituting for (15) and (16) in (14) the resulting differential equation r& is 
obtained: 
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(17)                                                                                                              ),(2 krfr =&  
The reduced system of two differential equations (13) and (17) together with an initial 
condition for capital, 0k and the transversality condition completely characterize the dynamic 
competitive equilibrium. 
2.2.2. Steady State Equilibrium and the Transition path 
In the long-run equilibrium in this economy, all endogenous variables are constant for all 
t, under the assumption that 0=k& , in particular. Such an equilibrium is called the steady state 
equilibrium. 














Then, from the Euler condition (7),  
(18)                                                                                                                        ρ=ssr  
must be true at the steady state, where ssr denotes the steady state value of the capital rental 
rate. Knowing ssr and that 0=k& , the intertemporal budget constraint of the household can be 
rewritten as 
(19)                                       ))(p,(),(),()(w0 1 ssssssssssssssss rcEkrrpskrr −+++= ψτ  
where ssk  and ssc are the steady state values of aggregate capital and the household's 
consumption, respectively. However, (19) still leaves us with two unknowns at the steady 
state, namely ssk and ssc . We know that for every point in time, including the steady state, the 
informal goods market clearing condition must hold: 
(20)                                                                                                       ),(3,3 ssssss kryc =    
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From (20),  












We know that  
(22)                                                                       )(p)(p))(p,( 31 31 γ
λλ
ssssssssss rrpcrcE +=  
Then, the expenditures of the household at the steady state can be represented by the function 









krE ++−=     
After plugging (23) in (19), one can solve (19) for the only unknown ssk . By substituting ssr  
and ssk  for r and k, the steady state values of the other endogenous variables can be found. 
Given the steady state values and initial conditions, the Time-Elimination Method is adopted 
(under the Eigenvalues-Eigenvectors Approach) to numerically solve for the transition path 
equilibrium (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). 
3. The Case of Turkey 
Informal sector activity, as in other developing economies, has remained significant in 
Turkey over the years14. According to a publicized report by the Tax Inspectors Board, the 
factors that promote informal activity in Turkey include low per capita income, low 
institutionalization rate in the private sector, underdeveloped capital and money markets, an 
inefficient tax system, and high tax rates, as well as high social security premium 
contributions15. An important indicator of volume of informal activity is the extent of 
employment that eludes government’s regulatory realm. In fact, the percentage of non-
agricultural workers not covered by the Social Security system can be taken as a proxy for 
the share of informal employment in the national economy (Loayza, 1996). According to 
State Institute of Statistics (SIS) employment figures for the year 2000, 35.3% of employed 
 13
persons in Turkey were employed in agriculture (only 0.89% of which were insured through 
the Social Security system), 24.7% of total employed persons were employed in non-
agricultural sectors and insured through the Social Security system, and the remaining 40% 
of employed persons were not insured, at all. For the remainder of the study, we will denote 
the insured workers as the ‘formally employed’. More strikingly, when we examine the 
breakdown of uninsured or ‘informally employed’, we see that 74.6% of the non-agricultural 
informal workforce was employed in the services sectors, hence we can regard the services 
sector as most concentrated in non-agricultural informal activity. 
Figure 2 depicts the counter-movement of income per capita and informal employment, 
over the period 1989-2001 in Turkey16. For most of the years, we casually observe that 
during the years of relative prosperity, the share of informal employment in non-agricultural 
employment has declined, and during years of economic downturn, it has increased. One 
explanation we can provide is that those who lose their jobs in the formal sector during 
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Source: WDI Online (2004) and Statistical Yearbook of Turkey (SIS), various issues 
Figure 2: Income per capita vs. informal employment, Turkey 
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One of the highly debated factors that contribute to the size of the informal sector is the 
high employment taxes in Turkey. In a report on informal employment by Ankara Chamber 
of Commerce17, it is stated that employment taxes in Turkey are among the highest in OECD 
countries (Figure 3). In this report it is stressed that besides leading to a large informal sector, 
high employment taxes in Turkey give rise to an unfair competition between those businesses 
which pay these taxes and those which don’t. According to the same report, high employment 
taxes along with limited enforcement lead to progressively heavier burdens on those 











































































Source: Deep Employment Report (2004), Ankara Chamber of Commerce 
Figure 3: Tax on Employment, Selected OECD Countries 
4. Model Calibration 
The model is calibrated to the Turkish economy for the year 2000. A simple aggregated 
Social Accounting Matrix with three production sectors, three consumption goods, and a 
representative household has been constructed based on National Accounts, employment and 
consumption statistics for the year 2000 (SIS, 2002). To estimate the size of informal sector 
 15
output, the procedure introduced in Kelley (1994) was followed. However unlike Kelley, 
instead of unpaid employment as a proxy for informal employment, uninsured non-
agricultural employment is taken as a proxy in this study18. It is found that in 2000, 
uninsured, informally employed persons in Turkey produce about 29.9% of the total output in 
the economy. Insured, formally employed persons produce about 53.7% of the total GDP, 
and the remaining 16.4% of the total GDP is the agricultural output. 
Table 1 summarizes production share parameters in each sector19: 
 Agriculture Formal Sector Informal Sector
Labor 0,46 0,26 0,58 
Capital 0,39 0,74 0,42 
Land 0,15   
Table 1: Factor elasticities 
These factor elasticities are such that relatively, informal sector has the highest labor 
intensity, and formal sector has the highest capital intensity. In the formal sector, the labor 
cost to the firm includes the contributions of the employer towards employee’s social security 
and unemployment insurance premiums. In Turkey, as per the Article 73 of the Social 
Insurance Act, this contribution ranges from 21.5% to 27% of the employee’s earnings20. In 
this study, the average 24.25% is chosen, and is considered to be a proxy for employment 
taxes paid by employers. 
As for the consumption patterns in Turkey, we can see that a large fraction of total 
expenditures (35.8%) are devoted to goods and services from the informal markets produced 
using labor intensive technologies21, along with food products (36.6%), and a relatively small 
proportion of expenditures on formally manufactured goods produced using capital intensive 
technologies, which include expenditures on durable consumer goods (27.6%). Table 2 
summarizes the parameters that characterize consumer behavior in the model. Here, 
supernumerary expenditures of the household refer to the expenditures made after setting 
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aside budget for the purchases of goods j in accordance with the parameters jγ at their 
respective prices. Essentially, the fraction parameters above reflect the consumption choices 
of the households when the economy is in the long-run, in other words, when the 
expenditures on subsistence consumption are insignificant enough in total expenditures22. 
Parameter Symbol Value 
Fraction of Supernumerary Expenditures spent on Good-1 1λ  0.15 
Fraction of Supernumerary Expenditures spent on Good-2 2λ  0.70 
Fraction of Supernumerary Expenditures spent on Good-3 3λ  0.15 
Rate of time preference ρ  0.042 
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution θ/1  1 
Table 2: Consumption parameters 
4.1. Simulation Results 
In Table 3, the simulation results from the baseline economy are presented. According to 
the model, development implies that the share of the agricultural sector in GDP falls from 
16.4% to a negligible amount, that of the informal manufacturing falls from 29.9% to 21.8%, 
and that of the formal manufacturing rises from 53.7% to 78% (Figure 4). As capital 
accumulates, agricultural sector loses labor to the formal sector which uses labor most 
efficiently among all sectors. Furthermore, agriculture also loses capital to both formal and 
informal sectors, thus agricultural output declines substantially. Even though it has a lower 
degree of capital intensity than the formal sector, informal sector is capable of competing for 
capital as the price of its product relative to the price of the formal product rises during the 
transition process. 
As capital accumulates over time, the increase in the productivity of labor causes wages 
to increase. As income of the household increases, level of expenditures in consumption for 
all goods increase, however, there is a decrease in the share of expenditures spent on 
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agricultural goods and on informally produced goods, and an increase in the share of formal 
sector goods, due to non-homothetic preferences (Figure 5). Thus, the drop in the share of 
agricultural output and in the informal sector output, and the rise in the share of formal sector 
output in GDP are reinforced by the non-homotheticity of preferences. 
Not surprisingly, these shares of labor and capital evolve in the same pattern as their 
respective sectors’ output evolves over time, that is, the uses of labor and capital in 
agricultural and informal sectors diminish as a share in total labor and capital, whereas the 
uses of labor and capital in formal sector increase, as shown in Figure 6 (sectoral capital 
shares not shown). In particular, as the economy transitions into the long-run equilibrium 
with the process of growth, the share of informal sector employment in non-agricultural 
employment (sum of informal and formal sectors’ employment) diminishes over time. Recall 
that one could detect an apparent negative relationship between per capita income and 
informal employment in the Turkish economy in the mid-1990’s to early 2000’s, as depicted 
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 t=0 Steady State 
Shares in GDP (%)   
Agricultural output 16.4 0.16 
Formal output 53.7 78 
Informal output 29.9 21.8 
Consumption shares in Expenditures (%)   
Agricultural good 36.6 17.9 
Formal sector good 35.8 60.2 
Informal sector good 27.6 21.8 
Sectoral allocation of labor (%)   
Agriculture 20.4 0.25 
Formal sector 31.5 56.5 
Informal sector 47.8 43.3 
Share of Informal labor in non-agr. Labor (%) 60.3 43.3 
Sectoral allocation of capital (%)   
Agriculture 11 Negligible 
Formal sector 67 86 
Informal sector 22 14 
Table 3: Baseline model simulation  
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Figure 5: Shares in expenditure 
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Figure 7: Share of informal employment in non-agricultural employment 
4.2. Experiments with lower tax rates on employment 
Table 4 reports the steady-state effects of lowering the formal sector employer’s rate of 
contribution towards employee’s social security premiums. When this rate is lowered from 
24.25% in the baseline economy, increases in formal sector output level as well as in capital 
stock and level of GDP can be observed. Particularly, when the tax rate is lowered to 20%, 
the long run values of formal output, capital stock and GDP all increase by 1.5%, whereas 
almost a 9% increase is detected in these variables when employment tax is completely 
eliminated. 
Tax rate 0.20 0.10 0.00 
GDP 1.46 5.07 8.95 
Capital stock 1.44 5.00 8.81 
Formal output 1.42 4.88 8.56 
Informal output -0.31 -1.18 -1.53 
Share of informal labor in non-agricultural labor -1.8 -6.24 -10.97 
(Percent change in steady state values from the baseline model.) 
Table 4: Results under alternative employment tax rates 
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Lower employment tax rates in the formal sector encourage a more efficient allocation of 
labor, and labor is reallocated into formal sector from the informal sector23. As a result, the 
fraction of informal labor in non-agricultural labor diminishes, first by 1.8% when the tax 
rate is reduced to 20%, and by 11% when the tax is completely eliminated. As labor moves 
out of the informal sector, this sector accommodates the loss of labor by hiring more capital 
services (informal sector firm maintains competitiveness in the capital market by increasing 
prices in the informal goods market to be able to afford increased use of capital), output in 
this sector drops as the increased use of capital cannot fully compensate for the loss of labor. 
As the employment tax rate is lowered, the total amount of tax collected from the formal 
sector gradually drops, hence the transfers to households drop, as well. On the other hand, as 
a source of income, increases in wages and particularly increases in capital earnings 
overwhelm the cut in transfers, therefore we see increases in income up to 9% for the 
representative household when employment tax is eliminated. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In developing countries, the informal sector is a large and a significant part of the 
economic life. The importance of the informal sector in terms of quality of institutions, 
employment, and also the effectiveness of economic policies has recently attracted many 
economists to conduct both empirical and theoretical research on the subject. However, what 
has been lacking in the literature so far was the study of the informal sector with the inclusion 
of the household demand perspective, and the study of the evolution of the informal sector 
vis-à-vis other sectors of the economy, in the process of economic growth as capital 
accumulates. In this study, highlighting the demand-side of the economy, we introduce a 
three-sector growth model with production in agricultural, formal and informal sectors: 
households prefer to devote a larger share of their expenditures on formal goods, and less on 
agricultural and informal goods as their incomes increase. This structure of the preferences 
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aptly summarizes the behavior of the various groups of consumers in developing countries: 
as income increases, consumers prefer less to buy from informal markets such as street 
bazaars and outdoor markets, and more from supermarkets and shopping malls. Although it 
can also be affected by numerous other factors, such as the quality of institutions, it is well 
observed that the size of the informal sector is closely related to income per capita. 
Within the framework of the model, we are able to trace the evolution of the three 
production sectors over time, as an economy accumulates capital and grows. In addition to 
tracing the evolution in each of the sectors, the model allows us to explain the evolution by 
studying the effects of factor movements between the sectors and the demand patterns of the 
households. Finally, it is shown that holding all else constant; a developing country can 
successfully reduce the fraction of informally employed in total employment by reducing the 
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1 Please see Danesh (1991) as a comprehensive research guide on the informal economy. 
2 In their article, Gang and Gangopadhyay (1990) have a similar structure in the supply side of the economy; 
however, they do not present demand-side relationships in their model economy. 
3 ibid. 
4 In Ihrig and Moe (2004), informal activity remains to be a part of the economy even in the long-run 
equilibrium; that is, as seen in the data, informal activity does not completely die out even in the developed 
economies. 
5 ibid. 
6 In fact, Ihrig and Moe (2004) mention in their study that having heterogeneous goods and endogenous 
prices would indeed affect the evolution of the informal sector as relative prices change due to capital 
accumulation over time, but they do not show this result explicitly. 
7 For algebraic simplicity, the scale parameter B is set at 321 321
λλλ λλλ −−−≡B . 
8 Similar Engel effects are mentioned in Tybout (2000) for those goods produced using "cottage technologies", 
implying small scale informal production, and studied in Irz and Roe (2001) for agricultural goods, and 
Echevarria (1997, 2000) for all types of goods. 






























The Euler is simplified since the world price of the agricultural good, p1 and the price of the formal good p2 are 











10 For algebraic simplicity, the scaling parameter B1 is set at 321 3211
ααα ααα −−−≡B . 
11 For algebraic simplicity, the scaling parameters B2  and B3  are set at .)1(,)1( 13
1
2
−−−− −≡−≡ δδββ δδββ BB  
12 Formal sector output is assumed to be the numeraire, and we set .12 ≡p  
13 Factor market clearing conditions can be summarized as: 
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14 For a comprehensive analysis of the informal sector and informal employment in Turkey, see Bulutay 
(2000). 
15 Hürriyet News (11.03.2003), Internet resource: www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,nvid~241170,0.asp 
16  Informal employment as “share of non-agricultural uninsured employment in total non-agricultural 
employment” 
17 Deep Employment Report by Ankara Chamber of Commerce (2004) at Internet source 
www.atonet.org.tr. 
18 In fact, in developing countries during the 1990's, the correlation between the share of urban informal 
sector employment (in total urban employment) and the share of uninsured employment (i.e. share of 
pension non-contributors) is quite high (The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003). 
19 About labor shares: we consider only the paid employed persons, because the unpaid family workers in 
agriculture skew the results for labor share in agriculture. Unpaid family workers most heavily work in 
agriculture. Compensation of employees in government services are also excluded, since this figure highly 
skews results for labor share as well . One striking feature of the agricultural sector is that as of 2000, only 
46.1% of employed persons in this sector are paid, the rest are unpaid family workers. 
20     Social Security Institution Internet source: www.ssk.gov.tr/wps/sskroot/bilgibankasi 
    /mevzuat /506eng/chapter8.jsp 
21 Since the informal sector produces a non-tradable home-good, the expenditures must be equal to value of 
output in this sector. 
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22    When 0=jγ , the preferences are of the Cobb-Douglas form. In our model, these values are obtained 







































    The values on the RHS are the initial share of expenditure on the consumption of each good by the 
household. Since the values of 0E are obtained from the data, jγ can be easily calculated. 
23 We cannot see large changes in agricultural sector employment since this sector is already allocating a 
very small fraction of total employment in the baseline economy in the long run. 
